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Abstract. Economic disparities often translate into disparities in political influence, 
rendering political liberties less worthy to poor citizens than to wealthier ones. 
Concerned with this, Rawls advocated that a guarantee of the fair value of political 
liberties be included in the first principle of justice as fairness, with significant 
regulatory and distributive implications. He nonetheless supplied little examination of 
the content and grounding of such guarantee, which we here offer. After examining 
three uncompelling arguments in its favor, we complete a more promising yet less 
explored argument that builds on the value of self-respect. We first inspect the 
conditions and duties that securing self-respect entails. We then look into how uneven 
allocations of the value of political liberties bear, expressively and due to the power 
imbalances they yield, on such conditions and duties. 
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1. Introduction: Rawls on Affluence and Influence 
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Economic disparities, such as those on the rise in recent decades, often translate into 
disparities in political influence. Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2014) have shown, for 
example, that US senators’ roll-call votes and federal government policy more closely 
correspond to the policy preferences of those in the top fifth of the income 
distribution than to those of middle- and low-income citizens. And Epp and Borghetto 
(2020) argue that, as inequality has grown in Europe, legislative agendas have 
migrated away from redistributive and social safety-net issues. On an influential view, 
this partly results from the fact that political liberties, albeit evenly distributed in 
liberal democracies, are often only formally secured, such that those with more 
resources to donate to electoral campaigns or with above average information, leisure 
time, and personal contact with elected officials can more effectively exercise them.  
Of the various philosophical reactions to this concern (see Christiano, 2012), 
Rawls’ has been the most influential. In response to similar worries by Daniels (1975) 
and Miller (1974), Rawls first distinguished political liberties from their value. Even 
when evenly allocated, he granted, political liberties are more useful to the wealthy, 
as they are better equipped to influence political outcomes. He then singled out 
political liberties for special treatment, such that the protection of their fair value be 
included in the first principle of justice as fairness and “everyone has a fair 
opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of political decisions” 
(Rawls, 2001: 327). 
Granting the fair value guarantee (hereinafter, the FVG) first-principle priority 
has profound implications. It renders impermissible that the fair value of political 
rights be traded for greater access to the primary goods, like income and job 
opportunities, that the other principles of justice as fairness allocate. And it forbids 
disenfranchising certain groups “on the grounds that their having these liberties may 
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enable them to block policies needed for economic growth and efficiency” (2001: 47). 
Its distributive implications are likewise profound (Daniels, 1975; Brighouse, 1997; 
Edmundson, 2017). The FVG commands that democratic policymaking be insulated 
from economic interests by, for example, limiting private donations to electoral 
campaigns and by publicly financing political parties (1996: 356-63). But it also 
requires restricting economic disparities that, capable of distorting political equality, 
the difference principle would otherwise allow (1999: 198-9).  
For all its significance, discussion of the FVG in Rawls’ work is scant, and 
arguments in its favor are often deemed imprecise or incomplete. The FVG remains, 
Niko Kolodny (2014: 196) notes, “one of the darkest corners” of his account.i  This 
paper aims to shed light on the content and grounding of the FVG. In particular, we 
examine three arguments that Rawls offered in its favor, all of which we find wanting, 
and complete a more promising argument, according to which the FVG is necessary, 
morally speaking, to fully secure citizens’ conviction of their own worth.ii 
Two reasons advise focusing on this argument. One is of scope. Given that 
analyses of the FVG often apply Rawls’ general arguments for the priority of liberty 
to the particular case of political liberties, they are not discriminating enough. They 
often have trouble explaining why these liberties alone merit special treatment, 
yielding false positives. The argument from self-respect, by contrast, suitably explains 
why political liberties alone merit such treatment. Second, in examining the 
relationship between political liberties and self-respect, we hope to clarify the idea of 
self-respect, which Rawls (1999: 386) considered the most important primary good 
but remains undertheorized.  
An important caveat before starting off is that, although the argument from self-
respect claims that the FVG is necessary to fully secure citizens’ conviction of their 
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own value, it nowise claims that it also suffices for this. In fact, someone who wields 
less political power than others, or who has no franchise to begin with, may have 
reason to be more convinced of her own worth, all things considered, than more 
powerful others. For she may have other conditions that are likewise necessary to 
wholly secure self-respect, like having one’s conception of the good appreciated by 
relatives and colleagues and suitably protected by nonpolitical liberties, as we detail 
in section 4.1, more fully realized. What the argument from self-respect seeks to show 
is modest, thus: that citizens’ self-respect, which hangs on various determinants, 
cannot be fully secured without the FVG. 
The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing the main features of the FVG 
in section 2 and inspecting three oft-cited arguments for it in section 3, we develop 
the argument from self-respect in section 4. We first distinguish the personal and the 
political conditions of self-respect, the latter of which entails two specific duties of 
mutual respect—a duty to respect others’ conception of the good and a duty to offer 
reasons to justify one’s political stance to them. We then look into how the allocation 
of political liberties and their value bears on these specific duties by inspecting its 
expressive effects and the power relations it entails, and discuss competing recent 
views by Krishnamurthy (2013), Schemmel (2018), and Wall (2006). Finally, we 
elaborate on the argument by considering two objections in section 5. 
 
2. Unpacking the fair value guarantee 
 
Rawls’ conceptions of basic liberties in Political Liberalism (1996) and in A Theory 
of Justice (1971) importantly differ. In the original formulation, the first principle of 
justice as fairness protects a fully adequate formal scheme of equal basic liberties, 
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including political liberties, for each individual compatible with the same liberties for 
all (Rawls, 1971: 302). In later work, Rawls (1996: 5) amends the first principle to 
include a proviso requiring that “political liberties, and only those liberties … be 
guaranteed their fair value.” 
In A Theory of Justice, basic liberties, political and nonpolitical alike, are 
protected only formally. They constitute a bundle of legally protected paths and 
opportunities whose worth hinges on the resources available to those who hold them. 
For example, freedom of speech is more valuable to the well heeled, as they will more 
easily access and control the press. The value of basic liberties is, thus, a matter of 
pure procedural justice: disparities in this regard are just if they result from a just 
basic structure. If just institutions render permissible, or perhaps mandatory, large 
disparities in income and wealth, disparities in the worth of basic liberties will be 
correspondingly large but presumably just.  
But how much inequality will a just society allow? The difference principle, 
according to which economic disparities are justified only if needed to make the worst 
off better off than otherwise, cannot prevent by itself that significant disparities arise. 
Their permissible size is ultimately contingent on empirical facts concerning the 
extent to which individual economic incentives may be required to boost productivity 
(Cohen, 1992), which may yield more or less egalitarian distributions in different 
societies. But what is relevant is that significant disparities may not be unjust. What 
motivates the redefining of basic liberties in Political Liberalism is that, left to its own 
devices, the difference principle may yield an uneven worth of political liberties, such 
that the wealthy have outsized political influence and can more easily get their way 
(Daniels, 1975; Cohen, 2002; Edmundson, 2017).  
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The FVG is introduced, then, to offset the reinforcing effects of socioeconomic 
inequalities and disparities in the worth of political liberties. But this does not entail 
that everyone’s political influence should be identical. It rather commands, in a way 
that is modeled on the principle of fair equality of opportunity, which Rawls’ second 
principle of justice grants, that “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly 
an equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of 
authority irrespective of their socioeconomic class” (Rawls, 2001, p. 46). The FVG 
seeks to equalize political influence only among those who are similarly skilled and 
motivated, as we further inspect in section 5. 
Note, however, that, although the FVG is modeled on the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity, it does not overlap with it. To start, each principle targets 
distinct distribuenda. Both arbitrate access to positions of authority and responsibility. 
But the principle of fair equality of opportunity applies to nonpolitical positions, in 
the private and the public sector alike, whereas the FVG is restricted to political 
positions. In addition, only the FVG enjoys first-principle priority, which entails that, 
for Rawls, it is more pressing to secure a fair competition for political positions than 
for nonpolitical ones. 
Also note that the specific focus on socioeconomic class and not on other 
factors, such as race or religion, does not entail that disparities in the worth of 
political liberty stemming from such factors are permissible. Rawls factors out race 
and religion and centers on class because, as we have seen, in a just society the 
difference principle may authorize economic inequalities but not inequalities of other 
kind (Pogge, 1992, p. 92). In nonideal scenarios, however, disparities in political 
influence are likely to result from racial or religious discrimination and not just from 
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economic disadvantage. We can venture that the scope of the FVG would then 
accordingly expand.  
 
3. Grounding the fair value guarantee 
 
Rawls offers four arguments for the FVG. Two of these, the strains-of-commitment 
argument and the argument from the first moral power, are general. They support the 
priority of basic liberties as a whole over other primary goods. The other two, the 
instrumental argument and the argument from self-respect, offer specific reasons for 
the priority of political liberties and their fair value. We here inspect the first three, 
leaving the fourth for the next section. 
Start with the strains-of-commitment argument, which targets freedom of 
conscience but Rawls deems likewise applicable to other freedoms (1999, p. 181). 
The idea, roughly, is that the parties to the original position, relying on their general 
understanding of human psychology, will avoid committing to principles that their 
representees will be unable to accept. Anything short of equal liberty of conscience, 
Rawls reckons, will create excessive strains of commitment. For people are unwilling 
to “take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral 
doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes” (1999, p. 181; see Taylor 2013 
and Hart 1989 for criticisms). But does political inequality generate excessive strains 
of commitment? Would people readily trade their political liberties for other goods?  
Examples of people putting their body or their freedom on the line to get 
suffrage abound. Suffragettes or African-American civil rights activists show that 
being denied franchise may cause unbearable strains of commitment. Note, however, 
that in both cases formal political equality, rather than fair political opportunity, was 
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primarily at stake. Applied to the FVG, the strains-of-commitment argument becomes 
less intuitive. For some may reasonably trade less political influence for more income 
or other valuable goods. Surely, empirical considerations of this sort do not 
undermine Rawls’ view, whose target is not existing preferences but “what persons 
need in their status as free an equal citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life” (1999, p. xiii). Under just institutions, 
Rawls may retort, citizens who conceive of themselves as free and equal would hardly 
renounce political influence. But Rawls fails to explain why exactly. The strains-of-
commitment argument offers no reason to explain what renders the unequal worth of 
political liberty unbearable—a reason that the argument from self-respect offers, as 
we will argue.   
 The second general argument leans on the first of the two moral powers 
whereby citizens conceive of themselves as free and equal. One such power is a sense 
of justice, a capacity to understand, apply, and be motivated by principles of justice. 
The other is a capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good. 
Each basic liberty supports these moral powers in its way. And Rawls suggests that 
political liberties are crucial to help citizens develop and exercise a sense of justice.iii 
Citizens who actively participate in politics are 
 
called upon to weigh interest other than [their] own and to be guided by some 
conception of justice and the public good rather than by [their] own 
inclinations. Having to explain and justify [their] views to others, [they] must 
appeal to principles that others can accept (Rawls, 1999, p. 206).  
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The argument from the first moral power has been connected to other 
Rawlsian concepts, like moral autonomy (Taylor, 2013), stability (Edmundson, 2017), 
and self-respect (Cohen, 2002). Its gist is that political liberties are pivotal to people’s 
sense of justice. For they facilitate that they reflect on, and suitably consider, other 
citizens’ views. 
 The Achilles heel of this argument is that it fails to show that political 
liberties, let alone their fair value, are necessary to develop a sense of justice. Wall 
(2006), for example, argues that nonpolitical realms may similarly foster a sense of 
justice. The family and the workplace do not just offer opportunities to exercise one’s 
sense of justice. They may also be a more fitting than politics, where interactions are 
more impersonal, to achieve this effect. If this is correct, tradeoffs between political 
liberties and other goods may not undermine people’s sense of justice, provided they 
can form a family and access meaningful jobs. And if one holds, contra Wall, that 
politics is special, and therefore irreplaceable in developing a sense of justice, the 
question of why political influence should be equal remains. As Brighouse (1997, p. 
163) notes, “[i]t may be that in fact a sense of justice is better developed by those who 
are the recipients of—or who at least can observe—mild but significant injustices and 
inequalities.” One thing is to show that the ability to exert political influence is critical 
to develop a sense of justice, quite another that this influence must be equal.  
 Take Rawls’ specific arguments next. The first is that political liberties have 
instrumental value, such that their fair value is needed to fully secure a just allocation 
of other primary goods. The FVG is included in the first principle, Rawls (1996, p. 
330) argues, because “it is essential in order to establish just legislation.” Political 
liberties are Hohfeldian powers: they render citizens able to change others’ legal 
relations, including the ability to replace representatives who may promote or allow 
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injustices while in office, arguably shielding citizens from such injustices.  
This argument is liable to three objections. First off, it is doubtful that the FVG 
is necessary for just legislation. There is growing evidence that economic disparities 
translate into disparities in political influence (Bartels, 2008; Sort, 2008; Gilens, 
2014; Epp and Borghetto, 2018). But equal political influence need not always yield 
just outcomes, as it may be used for good and for ill. Political liberties provide 
citizens with the power, for example, to cancel fellow citizens’ rights or “to block 
policies needed for economic growth and efficiency,” as Rawls (2001, p. 47) admits. 
It is hence hard to believe that, as Wall (2006, p. 251) argues, “irrespective of social 
circumstances, the guarantee for the fair value of political liberties is an indispensable 
condition for the justice of the political process.” Second, whether necessary or not 
for just legislation, proving the link is an empirical matter that exceeds the purview of 
philosophy. Third, even if political liberties were valuable for their impact on quality 
of government, they would be so in the aggregate yet not necessarily for each citizen 
(Brennan, 2012). In large political communities each particular vote has a negligible 
impact on political outcomes. So political liberties cannot be said to be instrumentally 
valuable for each individual. 
Rawls concedes some of these difficulties. Proving the link between the FVG 
and just legislation is a task for social scientists, he admits, not for political 
philosophers (2001: 226-227). He also concedes that, in terms of outcomes, Mill's 
system of plural voting “may be perfectly just,” provided extra votes for the better 
educated yield net gains in the full scheme of basic liberties (Rawls, 1999: 204-205). 
In response to these problems, Rawls deemphasizes the instrumental value of the 
FVG in favor of noninstrumental reasons, which prompts the argument from self-
respect.  
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4. The argument from self-respect 
 
The argument from self-respect is scattered over several remarks in A Theory of 
Justice about the significance of self-respect, which Rawls considers the most 
important primary good (1999: 386). Rawls defines self-respect as a psychological 
condition with two components. One is a person’s sense of her own worth, a secure 
conviction that her conception of the good is valuable and worth pursuing. The other 
is confidence in one’s ability to realize that conception. When self-respect is lacking, 
Rawls posits, we fail to find our ends worth pursuing and may “sink into apathy and 
cynicism” (1999: 386). It is for this reason rational for the parties to the original 
position to avoid, “at almost any cost,” social conditions that may undermine the self-
respect of their representees (1999: 386). 
Rawls believes that self-respect is not fully secured when the status of equal 
citizenship is not publicly affirmed for all, which happens when fundamental rights 
and liberties, and the value of political liberties in particular, are unevenly allocated. 
In other words, for Rawls, the social bases of self-respect—those aspects of basic 
institutions needed to secure people’s sense of their own worth and confidence in their 
ability to realize their conception of the good—include legally prescribed rights and 
liberties, among which political liberties are special. “The effect of self-government 
where equal political rights have their fair value,” he contends (1999: 234), “is to 
enhance the self-esteem … of the average citizen.” 
But why does the public affirmation of fair-valued political liberties comprise 
the social bases of self-respect, such that they are indispensible to fully secure it? One 
criticism is that the psychological attitude of the self-respecting person (her 
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confidence in the value of her conception of the good and in her ability to realize it) is 
distinct from the attitude that the rights and liberties comprising the bases of self-
respect (the recognition of the equal status as citizen) foster (Doopelt 2009; Eyal 
2009; Moriarty 2009). Another is that political liberties, and their fair value, may be 
unnecessary to wholly secure a conviction of one’s own worth. According to Wall 
(2006), arrangements other than political liberties, such as equal civil liberties and a 
fair share of wealth, may suffice to fully secure citizens’ self-respect.  
Rawls invites these objections as he fails to account for why the status of 
equal citizenship is necessary for self-respect. He reckons that a “subordinate ranking 
in public life would indeed be humiliating and destructive of self-esteem” (1999: 
477). But this is a restatement of the idea, rather than an argument for it, which the 
remainder of this section offers.  
 
4.1 The conditions and duties of self-respect 
 
Before unfolding the argument, the specific conditions and duties that Rawls’ idea of 
self-respect entails bear clarifying. Start with the conditions. Rawls holds that self-
respect is supported by a number of conditions, namely the circumstances under 
which individuals have moral reasons to acquire and securely sustain, other things 
being equal, a self-respecting attitude. These conditions, which are distinct from the 
institutional arrangements that support them (i.e., the social bases of self-respect), 
comprise personal conditions and political ones (Stark, 2012). 
Personal conditions include having a rational plan of life that satisfies the 
Aristotelian principle—that is, a plan that engages one’s talents and natural capacities 
in an interesting and challenging way—plus the appreciation of one’s deeds by fellow 
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associates like relatives, friends, and colleagues (1971: 440). The connection between 
these conditions and basic liberties is straightforward. On the one hand, liberties like 
free speech, freedom of conscience, and freedom of movement enable individuals to 
freely choose and pursue the ends that may suitably realize their abilities. Freedom of 
association, on the other hand, guarantees that they can interact with people of similar 
inclinations and abilities who may appreciate their endeavors, such as friendships, 
families, congregations, scientific and artistic societies, and sports associations. 
 A third, political condition is also required for self-respect, Rawls posits. This 
condition requires that “whenever in public life, citizens respect one another’s ends 
and adjudicate their political claims in ways that also support their self-esteem” 
(1971, p. 442). And it is of particular relevance because it is a “background 
condition,” meaning two things. One is that it is necessary for the effectiveness of the 
other two. The other is that it ensures that people keep a self-respecting attitude when 
they venture out of the associations they belong to and interact with other people. This 
interaction is typical of politics. But, given that societies where Rawls’ principles are 
in place will not be segregated into isolated associations, it is likely to occur across 
the board. 
 The political condition requires that citizens respect one another’s ends in the 
public realm, Rawls holds. To flesh this idea out, it pays turning to Rawls’ account of 
the duty of mutual respect (Stark, 2012). The duty of mutual respect is a natural duty 
that the parties to the original position endorse (Rawls, 1971, p. 178-9). It is the duty 
to show the respect that everyone deserves as a moral being, as someone with a sense 
of justice and a conception of the good. And, on Rawls’ view, it is discharged by our 
willingness “to see the situation of others from their point of view, from the 
perspective of their conception of the good; and [by] our being prepared to give 
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reasons for our actions whenever the interests of others are materially affected” 
(1971: 337). The general duty of mutual respect entails, in brief, two specific duties: a 
duty to respect others’ conception of the good and a duty to credit them as being 
entitled to political justification. 
 To examine the link between the FVG and self-respect we need, thus, to look 
into how the allocation of political liberties and their value bears on these specific 
duties. The argument from self-respect, which we now unfold, undertakes this task by 
inspecting the expressive effects of this allocation and the power relations it entails. 
 
4.2 The expressive value of political liberties 
 
Take expressive effects first.iv Self-respect requires, to repeat, both the appraisal 
(personal condition) and the respect (political condition) of others. How political 
institutions treat us importantly affects, Rawls believes, “how we think others value 
us” (1999: 477), and thus self-respect. One way in which political institutions do this 
is by publicly marking individuals as worthy or unworthy of attitudes like respect, 
esteem, admiration, and so on in fellow citizens’ eyes, as when state officials publicly 
express equal consideration of, or deprecation for, certain religious or sexual 
minorities. On Rawls’ view, an uneven allocation of basic liberties, and of the value 
of political liberties, diminishes the self-respecting attitudes of those at the losing end 
of the allocation in this expressive way. For it has “the effect of publicly establishing 
their inferiority as defined by the basic structure of the society” (1971: 544, our 
italics), which is “humiliating and destructive of [their] self-esteem” (ibid). It 
expressively thwarts, in brief, the political condition of self-respect.  
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To unfold this idea, first consider how an uneven allocation of basic liberties, 
nonpolitical and political alike, may expressively harm individuals’ conception of the 
good, infringing the first duty of mutual respect as a result. If, for example, the state 
enacts labor laws limiting some jobs to men, as in Russia, where women cannot drive 
trains, it sends a message that infringes the first duty in two ways. First, and most 
obvious, in passing and enforcing such laws, the state shows disrespect toward 
women who wish, but are unable, to take these jobs. It fails to regulate the job market 
such that their conception of the good is suitably considered. Second, in so doing, the 
state also harms women who, uninterested in such jobs today, might nonetheless 
change their mind in the future. It fails to fittingly include their point of view as moral 
agents with a capacity to revise their conception of the good. And the same happens 
with political liberties. Disenfranchising some expresses disrespect toward the 
conception of the good of those who wish but are unable to exercise those liberties 
and toward the moral agency of those who, uninterested in voting or running for 
office today, may want and will be unable to do so in the future. 
Next consider how being denied political liberties infringes the second duty of 
mutual respect, which it does in a way that being denied nonpolitical liberties does 
not. When the state denies the franchise to some, like women in the past or felons in 
some countries today, it publicly expresses that they are unworthy of directly 
influencing political decisions. Their status as equal authorities in the community of 
justification is then undermined. For their reasons are less than fully included in the 
“game of giving and asking for reasons” that characterizes the political process, as 
Rainer Forst (2012: 38) puts it. As a result, a reason that enfranchised others would 
otherwise have to justify their political stance to them—a reason that seeing them as 
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equal authorities yields—no longer exists. They then have, to put it differently, a 
reason not to discharge their second duty of mutual respect.  
And this is a reason that holds, as we will further discuss in the next section, 
whether or not they act on it. As it happens, some of those who have franchise may 
justify their political stance to their less fortunate peers out of pity or plain decency. 
But just as men under coverture laws—whereby women’s rights were subsumed by 
those of their husband—had a reason not to see their wives as equal authorities in the 
family, whether or not they happened to act on such reason, enfranchised citizens 
have a reason not see disenfranchised others as equal authorities in the political 
community they belong to, and to fail to justify their political stance to them, whether 
they happen to act on such reason or not.v 
None of this shows, however, that these expressive harms to self-respect occur 
when the FVG is not secured. Disenfranchising women or felons, some may argue, no 
doubt expresses disrespect toward them. But formal political equality may suffice to 
avoid so doing, just as formal equality of nonpolitical basic liberties may suffice to 
avoid so doing. There are two differences, however, that warrant that political 
liberties, unlike nonpolitical ones, be singled out for special treatment. 
First off, unlike most goods to which nonpolitical liberties provide access, 
political power is competitive, or at any rate more competitive than nonpolitical goods 
(Rawls 1996: 358; 2001: 150; see also Brighouse and Swift, 2006: 476; Pogge, 1989: 
147-8). The value of freedom of conscience or of freedom of movement for a 
particular citizen does not hang, or less so compared to the value of political rights, on 
the extent to which others have and exercise these freedoms. If others cannot pilgrim 
because they are penniless, one’s ability to pilgrim does not become eo ipso more 
valuable. By contrast, the amount of political influence each citizen wields is partly a 
 
17 
function of her position in the distribution of political influence. If the poor have less 
influence than they would if the FVG was secured, the amount of influence that the 
wealthy wield does not remain constant. It increases. And, with it, the extent to which 
poor citizens’ views are publicly disfavored, compared to the views of wealthier ones, 
likewise increases. 
Second, unlike other basic liberties, political liberties are tools to influence 
how the state and its policies should be arranged. When the state allows disparities in 
the worth of nonpolitical liberties, it no doubt allows that the wealthy be more capable 
to fully develop their conception of the good. For example, the well heeled may more 
often travel or donate to their local church than the poor, which may result, other 
things equal, in disparities in how confident of their ability to securely develop their 
conception of the good each of them is. Yet, in so doing, and insofar as economic 
disparities are authorized by the difference principle, and hence permissible, the state 
does not publicly favor affluent citizens’ conceptions of the good over those of less 
affluent citizens. It remains neutral. By contrast, when the state allows that political 
liberties be more valuable to the rich than to the poor, it no longer remains neutral 
between competing views of how the state itself, and its policies, should be organized. 
For it publicly expresses that the rich should be allowed to wield greater influence 
over its decisions, which is likely to yield legislation that favors their views over those 
of less affluent, yet similarly willing and able, citizens.  
The public message the state flags when uneven political influence exists 
infringes the two specific duties of mutual respect. First, in publicly allowing that 
poor citizens’ conception of the good be less appositely included in the resulting 
legislation, the wealthy have reason not to discharge their duty to suitably consider 
their conceptions of the good. If, for example, the state systematically discriminates 
 
18 
against the cultural and leisure activities of the poor in favor of those that the wealthy 
prefer, so the wealthy monopolize public broadcasting and state theaters, and this 
occurs because elected official turn their attention away from the poor, then the 
wealthy have a reason to see the cultural and leisure tastes of the poor as less worthy 
of public support, and less worthy simpliciter, than theirs. On the other hand, if the 
wealthy believe that the views of the poor have little chance to be suitably considered 
by elected officials, no matter how organized and willing to influence political 
decisions the poor may be, then the wealthy have reason to no longer justify their 
political stance to them. For persuasion—the chief means to advance their interests 
when opportunities for political influence are evenly distributed—is no longer needed 
to advance their political ends. 
To clarify our point, consider how it differs from Meena Krishnamurthy’s 
(2013) attempt to complete Rawls’ argument from self-respect. Failure to secure the 
FVG, Krishnamurthy argues, undermines people’s self-respect because it expresses an 
unequal valuing of both their private interests and their views on the public good 
resulting from their exercise of their two moral powers. Our claim that political 
inequality infringes the duty to respect others’ conceptions of the good—the first duty 
of mutual respect—nicely overlaps with the two strains of her view. For a complete 
conception of the good has both a private and a public dimension. We agree, thus, 
regarding the effects that the FVG has on how people’s conception of the good is 
publicly perceived. But her argument, we also argue, is incomplete. It misses an 
important dimension of the expressive value of political liberties: that how their value 
is distributed publicly signals the extent to which individuals credit each other, in the 
shared space of justifying reasons that a political community entails, with being able 
to give and receive reason as members of equal standing. Thus, when the state allows 
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that the value of political liberties be unevenly allocated, such that similarly able and 
motivated citizens cannot influence political decisions as much as wealthier ones, it 
does not just express that their conceptions of the good are not as worthy of respect, 
as Krishnamurthy claims. It also expresses that they are not equal authorities, fully 
able to give and receive reasons, in the shared space of justification that a political 
community involves. This is what our argument regarding the second duty of mutual 
respect seeks to capture. 
Expressive arguments for the FVG, like Krishnamurthy’s and ours, are 
nonetheless liable to two related concerns. For they rely on how self-perception 
depends on how others perceive us, which is in turn contingent on how institutions 
publicly treat us. The first concern is that, when the people as a whole are 
disempowered, as in a dictatorship, it seems unreasonable to infer how others view us 
from how the state treats us.vi We partly concur. The expressive capacity of political 
institutions importantly hinges on the extent to which such institutions reflect people’s 
views, something only well functioning democracies suitably do. (This is anyway the 
case in Rawls’ account, whose application he restricts to constitutional democracies.) 
But this does not entail that when state action fails to track such views, tracking those 
of a dictator instead, subjects can no longer infer what others think of them from what 
the state does. For, in addition to reflecting or failing to reflect how people see each 
other, state action, including nondemocratic state action, also alters how people see 
one another. For example, LGBT+ folks in democracies surely have reason to infer 
how others see them if gay marriage gets banned. But they also have reason to do so 
when, living in a dictatorship, the same occurs. Not just because even dictators need 
support from at least some influential groups to remain in power, thus having to 
reflect their views in policymaking to some degree, but also due to the ability of state 
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directives to shape the existing social ethos and how people see each other, given how 
pervasive, coercive, final, and hard to avoid such directives are, as we argue in the 
next section.  
A second concern is that, if nonexpressive reasons why the value of political 
liberties bears on self-respect are absent, some may then argue that the reason why 
failure to secure the FVG is harmful is entirely contingent on the existing background 
of shared beliefs (Wall 2006: 260-261). In many democracies concentrations of 
political influence stemming from concentrations of wealth may no doubt trigger 
outrage and disaffection. Yet they may perhaps entirely do so as a result of shared 
beliefs that are historically contingent and could be replaced by more innocuous 
beliefs (Brennan 2012). This is true, yet only in part. Expressive harms to self-respect 
no doubt hang on the existing background of shared beliefs. Alternative bundles of 
shared beliefs could, then, render the failure to secure the FVG publicly inoffensive, 
unless independent reasons for the link between political liberties and self-respect 
existed. One such reason is available, however, which we next inspect. 
 
4.3 Political subordination 
 
We have so far argued that, when the state authorizes that similarly able and 
motivated citizens wield uneven influence just because some are wealthier than 
others, political decisions expressively affect how they see each other and their self-
respect. But disparities in political influence also affect self-respect for a different, 
albeit related, reason: the kind of subordination such disparities entail.  
What harms nonaffluent citizens’ conviction of their own worth is not only, 
and not always, that state decisions do not publicly reflect their views in a suitable 
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way. Democratic deliberation and majority rule may legitimately yield this result, 
with no trespassing of the duties of mutual respect, if the wealthy, for example, 
manage to persuade a majority to back their views, or if the views of some 
nonaffluent citizens are endorsed just by a minority and accordingly outvoted. The 
result is troubling, we here argue, when failure to reflect some citizens’ views is the 
upshot not of persuasion but of a power relation whereby the wealthy can, by means 
of legislation, systematically subject the poor to their will. 
Krishnamurthy (2013) argues that, when the FVG is not secured, “the rich are 
able to control the course of legislation to their advantage [and] the interests of the 
poor are disregarded [which] is undermining of the poor’s sense of self-respect” 
(2013: 185). We concur. What we argue, however, is that what renders this result 
undermining of the poor’s sense of their own worth, in a way that disparities in the 
value of nonpolitical liberties or in the allocation of nonpolitical power do not, is not 
only that it suggests that the interests of the poor are not of equal value or concern 
(Krishnamurthy 2013: 186). It is also that their interests are disregarded as a result of 
a relation whereby the powerful may subject the powerless to their will in a way that 
is particularly pervasive, final, coercive, and hard to avoid, which in turn affects how 
they see each other. Being at the upper end of such power relation, we contend, the 
wealthy have reason to think that it is up to them to decide when and how, if at all, 
less affluent citizens’ conceptions of the good should be considered in political 
decisions, and to cease justifying their political stance to them as equal authorities of 
the same political community. 
Power imbalances no doubt extend beyond politics. They are ubiquitous, 
pervading families, workplaces, churches, and universities without necessarily 
impairing the self-respect of children, employees, priests, and students. We argue that 
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what renders imbalances in the value of political liberties special, and especially 
undermining of self-respect, is that political liberties grant access to a kind of power 
that, due to its specific features, especially bears on the two specific duties of mutual 
respect. We unfold the argument in two steps. We first look into the specifics of 
political power.vii We then examine how an uneven allocation thereof bears on the 
duties of mutual respect. 
Political power is, to start, particularly pervasive and sweeping. Those who 
wield it may impose their views on an extensive range of fundamental matters 
affecting the wellbeing of those subject to it, including their security and physical 
integrity, their access to basic goods, such as education or health care, their economic 
opportunities, and their ability to form a family. They may also alter their legal 
position as to whether they may freely move, whether they may be arbitrarily arrested 
and punished, whether they may enter into market exchanges, and so on. And they 
can do either with final authority: directives in nonpolitical realms that are critical to 
sustain the personal conditions of self-respect, including the family or the workplace, 
are subordinated to political directives, and turned down when in conflict with them. 
When similarly able and motivated citizens have uneven political influence just 
because some are wealthier than others, the wealthy are reassured in their ability to 
submit nonaffluent others to their will by the fact that the legislation they control is 
placed at the top of the legal hierarchy. It may override norms governing nonpolitical 
realms where citizens seek to realize, qua parents, workers, worshippers, or students, 
their conception of the good. 
Political power is also coercive, in a particular sense. Those who wield it can 
permissibly subject others to physical compulsion, including threatening them with 
imprisonment, to induce compliance. Sure, those who wield other forms of power, 
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like employers do in monopsonistic labor markets, may also coerce those subject to it. 
But they cannot permissibly exert physical compulsion over them. A kind of 
compulsion that is special, and especially harmful to the self-respect of those who 
lack control over it, because it preempts any other type of consideration, including 
attempts at rationally persuading those at the receiving end of the power relation to 
achieve this effect. 
Finally, political power is inescapable, or harder to escape anyway than other 
forms of power, like the power that managers often wield over first-line employees, 
which, if abused, may also undermine workers’ conviction of their own worth. 
Perhaps the poor could avoid political power by fleeing their home country. But 
migration is costly, surely more so than quitting a job, when possible at all. And it 
anyway involves submission to political power in another jurisdiction where 
nonaffluent migrants, if the FVG is not secured or if they are denied franchise 
altogether in their new destination, will be likewise subordinated to others. 
Thus, when the state allows that some citizens, despite similar aptness and 
motivation, remain less able than their wealthier peers, or entirely helpless, to exert 
their share of political power, it allows that the wealthy subordinate them in this 
particular way. When, for example, the preferences of voters in the upper third of the 
income distribution have roughly 50 percent more chances to impact the voting 
choices of their senators than the preferences of those in the middle third, as 
according to Larry Bartels (2008: 254) is the case in the US, and when the preferences 
of those in the bottom third have “no weight at all in the voting decisions of their 
senators,” high-income citizens subject less affluent citizens to their will. And they do 
so in a way that is pervasive, final, inescapable, and enforceable through physical 
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compulsion—with mid-income citizens being less able, and low-income ones entirely 
unable, of legally fighting them off.  
Such power hierarchy is harmful to the self-respect of the poor because of its 
bearing on the two duties of mutual respect. On the one hand, mid- and low-income 
citizens’ conceptions of the good fail, when this occurs, to be suitably reflected in 
political decisions, and in nonpolitical domains as a result, in a way that is sweeping 
and final. Higher-income citizens subject mid- and low-income citizens to their views, 
then, not just by getting their way in the regulation of nonpolitical realms that are 
critical to realize the personal conditions of self-respect—that is, to jointly realize 
people’s conception of the good. For example, they may then succeed in banning gay 
marriage, in hindering certain market exchanges, in restricting some reproductive 
choices, in relaxing health and safety workplace regulations, or in rendering certain 
worships unlawful. They also do so in a way that, whenever nonpolitical activities 
conflict with their views, political directives, whose authority is final, prevail. Uneven 
political influence entails, in brief, that the conceptions of the good of citizens whose 
power is scant are both unsuitably reflected by political decisions and, resulting from 
the all-encompassing and final nature of such decisions, affected and potentially 
trespassed in nonpolitical domains, yielding a reason for more affluent and influent 
citizens not to regard them as equal authorities in the community of justification they 
belong to. 
On the other hand, because political decisions are backed by the permissible 
threat of physical force and hard to elude, higher-income citizens have little reason, 
other things equal, to justify their political stance to less affluent ones. Should the 
costs of noncompliance, whether by emigration or by disobedience, be low, the 
wealthy would have a reason to justify their political stance to their less influential 
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peers. Credible threats of nonconformity may elicit, sometimes discharged honestly, 
sometimes as window dressing, public justification. But given that costs of emigrating 
and of disobeying are considerable, no such reason exists. 
Note, then, that, contrary to what Wall (2006) and Brennan (2012) argue, this 
kind of political subordination bears on self-respect in a way that does not exclusively 
hang on the shared beliefs in place. It also depends on the features of political power 
we have here examined. And these features are not contingent. The pervasiveness and 
unavoidability of political power may be mitigated but not entirely go away. And its 
final and physically coercive character is constitutive of it. So their bearing on 
citizens’ conviction of their own worth is neither contingent. It holds, contra Brennan 
and Wall, across a wide range of actual and nonactual circumstances. 
A plausible objection, raised by Christian Schemmel (2018), is that disparities 
in political influence need not undermine self-respect if those whose influence is scant 
can resort to alternative means to secure it through the associations they are active in. 
Schemmel holds that a political system in which the wealthy hold disproportionate 
political influence may no doubt be disrespectful and insulting toward nonaffluent 
citizens whose influence is limited. Yet, absent formal political exclusions, it need not 
result in poorer citizens having a reason to lose their conviction of their own worth if, 
say, a lively protest movement exists and they can “shore up said convictions in 
solidaristic action with fellow sufferers of the same injustice” (11-12). This is because 
self-respect, on Schemmel’s view, is a robust capacity to retain the conviction of 
one’s own worth under adversity, including unjust circumstances like those in which 
the well heeled dominate politics and less affluent citizens systematically lose out. 
We concur that securing self-respect should not be equated with achieving 
fully just institutions, and that a self-respecting person should be able to face adverse 
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circumstances without losing integrity. But we also believe that how political 
influence is allocated is special to secure such ability. For it is critical to ensure that 
people with different conceptions of the good can secure self-respect by means of 
associating with like-minded citizens but can also venture out of such associations 
keeping a self-respecting attitude. It is, in Rawlsian terms, critical to realize the 
political condition of self-respect, which is necessary for how effective the personal 
conditions, as discussed in section 4.1, are. 
Our point here is not, or not mainly, that disparities in the worth of political 
liberties, such as those in Schemmel’s example, are harmful to self-respect because 
some may then see their willingness, present or future, to exert political influence 
publicly frustrated, which in turn affects how others see them. Our point is that such 
disparities are harmful because, when they exist, the wealthy have reason not to 
suitably consider the views of less affluent citizens and are able to subject them to 
their will across many domains, including those in which associations with fellow 
sufferers can occur. They may, whether they actually do it or not, outlaw their 
religion. They may preclude them from joining a union. They may ban the local 
associations they are active in. And they may do so, or threaten with so doing, with no 
justification offered. It is thus not unwarranted to believe that, when this occurs, 
poorer citizens’ self-respect is wronged. Not because anything sort of complete social 
justice is harmful to self-respect but due, instead, to the special impact that political 
power has on social interaction. An unequal distribution of political power gives those 
on the upper end of the power allocation the capacity to decisively and forcefully 
affect, whether they exert such capacity or just hint at the possibility so doing, the 
ways in which those on the losing end of the allocation shore up their convictions in 
solidaristic action with others. 
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A possible rejoinder is that those at the receiving end of power imbalances of 
this kind should be free to assess how strongly such imbalances bear on their self-
respect.viii As agents, individuals can reflect on whether they should or should not let 
the state, or other external influences, have an impact on how confident they are of 
themselves, their projects, and their ability to securely develop them. So trying to 
persuade a person whose self-respecting attitude is robust, however politically 
powerless she may be, that she has a reason not to have this attitude could be 
obnoxious.   
Note, however, that, for all the importance this insight may have to grasp how 
empirical self-respect works, normative accounts of self-respect, like the one we here 
employ, focus on the moral reasons people may have for a secure conviction of their 
own worth, and on how compelling such reasons may be. Normative self-respect 
refers, Schemmel (2018: 7) notes, “to the moral correctness of individuals’ 
convictions of their own worth, not to their status in the own eyes.” This is 
particularly clear when it comes to Rawls’ account of self-respect, which conveys not 
individuals’ de facto psychology but the moral psychology that grounds his 
conception of justice. Rawls’ account is anchored in his political conception of 
persons as free and equal citizens with two moral powers (Rawls, 1996: 29-35). A 
conception he uses to organize many central concepts of justice as fairness. For 
example, his list of primary goods results from what citizens need to exercise their 
two moral powers in a scheme of social cooperation, rather than from what people 
may here and now want (Rawls, 1982). And the same happens with self-respect and 
the conditions to secure it, which raise the question of when and why free and equal 
citizens have a reason to feel their sense of self-worth threatened, whether or not some 
may happen not to act on such reason. This is the question this article seeks to answer. 
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We thus concur that, as a matter of fact, some individuals may not be moved 
by the reasons that the duties of mutual respect, when undischarged, yield. They may 
not be troubled when, due to an uneven allocation of political power, the wealthy can 
subordinate them in the special way such power entails, either because they may have 
naturalized the views of more powerful groups or, as the rejoinder has it, because 
their psychological strength to maintain a self-respecting attitude under adversity is 
resilient enough. But the mere possibility of these reactions does not defeat the 
argument from self-respect, we think, for the same reason that Rawls’ list of primary 
goods is not defeated because, as a matter of fact, some individuals might find some 
of these goods useless. 
 
5. Objections 
 
We have argued that the FVG is warranted to avoid disparities in political power that, 
either expressively or because of the kind of subordination they entail, bear on the 
self-respect of those at the losing end of the power allocation. We now elaborate on 
this argument by addressing two further objections.  
The first objection points to the difference between fair and equal political 
opportunity. The FVG (only) aims to ensure that citizens with similar skills and 
motivation have similar influence. It is compatible with inequalities in political power 
mapping onto individual disparities in political skills and motivation. Very often, 
however, these disparities are not random. They correlate with socioeconomic class, 
such that political skills and motivation tend to be higher among those who have more 
wealth and education. The FVG fails to fully secure self-respect, so the objection may 
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go, because it may be satisfied if the superior political skills and motivation of the 
affluent translate into more political power.  
We raise two points in response. The first is that in a just society we should not 
expect differences in political skills and motivation to map onto income and wealth or 
any generic individual features such as race or gender. A just basic structure 
guarantees that everyone has roughly equal chances to develop political skill and 
motivation. And although education is critical to this effect, having equal chances to 
influence political decisions, as such, is also important to achieve this effect. For 
political disengagement and apathy often results from the perception that one’s 
concerns go unattended, as Solt (2008) has shown. The moral is that the FVG should 
not be assessed independently from the other pieces of Rawls’ theory. Correlation 
between political skill and socioeconomic inequality is, in principle, compatible with 
the FVG. But often it may just indicate that the basic structure is failing to operate 
justly. 
A plausible rejoinder is that even if just institutions weaken the correlation 
between class and political skills, the natural lottery will unevenly distribute political 
talent, yielding inequalities of political power, which leads us to a second point. In a 
just society those with more charisma and eloquence will no doubt exert greater 
political power. The question is whether or not these inequalities can and should be 
cancelled out. Given that individuals cannot be entirely leveled in their talents and 
motivations, strict equality of political influence can only be achieved by restricting 
the means to exert influence of the politically talented, for example, by limiting their 
freedom of political speech (Edmundson, 2017: 57). Measures of this sort, however, 
risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater. For they impinge on the central range 
of application of other nonpolitical liberties protected by the first principle. It is not 
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simply that this “egalitarian collapse” conflicts with other Rawlsian commitments 
(Krouse and McPherson, 1988: 85). It is also the case that the bases of self-respect 
encompass nonpolitical liberties, such that infringing their central range is likely to 
undermine individuals’ conviction of their equal worth more than disparities in 
political power that may arise in a just Rawlsian society, which as we have seen we 
should expect to be moderate.  
 Consider now the second objection. Given that our argument ultimately 
depends on avoiding political inequalities that bear on citizens’ self-respect, some 
may argue that such disparities can be reduced without securing the FVG. This may 
occur in two distinct ways. It may occur, to start, if the link between power and 
political liberties is weakened enough. If the existing amount of political power is 
reduced because the state capacity is replaced by market forces or by anarchist social 
arrangements, or significantly constrained because policymaking is transferred away 
to independent agencies or submitted to exacting constitutional limits, disparities in 
the allocation of political liberties and their value may have negligible impact on 
citizens’ self-respect. Alternatively, disparities of political power may perhaps be 
avoided, with no alteration in the existing amount of political power, if access to such 
power is similarly restricted for all. If the harm done to citizens’ self-respect is due to 
disparities in political power, then leveling down all citizens by similarly 
disenfranchising them may permissibly avoid such harm (Taylor, 2013: 150).   
Again, we raise two points in response. The first is that if we consider these 
alternatives from Rawls’ particular view, then both are nonstarters. For one thing, 
alternatives such as radically downsizing state capacity would render public powers 
helpless to realize other Rawlsian commitments, such as maximizing the social 
position of the least advantaged. For another, while the alternative of disenfranchising 
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all citizens would perhaps avoid harming citizens’ conviction of their own worth, it 
would not avoid undermining other aims that political liberties seek to advance, such 
as the development of individuals’ two moral powers.  
 Our second point leaves aside how these alternatives square with other parts of 
Rawls’ theory. It considers the objection as such. Take first the possibility of 
downsizing or constraining state capacity. The amount of existing political power no 
doubt bears on how disparities in its allocation affect citizens’ self-respect. If the total 
amount of political power is drastically reduced or constrained, the self-respect of 
those at the receiving end of an uneven allocation of power is accordingly less 
affected. But this does not rebut that the link between political liberties and self-
respect hangs on the amount of political power that such liberties grant. It rather 
confirms it. Certainly, if the state were entirely replaced by market forces or anarchist 
social arrangements, assuming this is at all possible, the allocation of political 
liberties, and their value, would be of little import. Yet, where political power exists 
(and we have no trouble restricting the scope of the argument from self-respect to 
circumstances where this condition holds), uneven allocations of such liberties and 
their worth will bear, for the above reasons, on the self-respect of those subject to the 
kind of power these liberties confer. 
This claim similarly applies to the alternative of disenfranchising all citizens 
to sidestep disparities in political influence. Given that a decision maker is needed 
where political decisions are to be made, this alternative is far-fetched. For if elections 
are suspended, then someone else (an epistocratic council, a noblesse-oblige elite, a 
dictatorship of the proletariat) will inevitably replace voters in wielding political 
power. And if, alternatively, voting were replaced by selection by lot, the critical issue 
of establishing how to allocate political liberties and their value would merely 
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translate into the issue of whom, or whose political ideas or preferences, should be 
selected by these means. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
“We can have democracy in this country, or we can have great wealth concentrated in 
the hands of a few, but we can’t have both,” Louis Brandeis famously reckoned. 
Rawls addressed this concern by advocating that the fair value of political liberties be 
secured by the first principle of justice as fairness. We have examined three 
uncompelling arguments for this guarantee, and have developed an argument 
according to which the FVG is necessary, morally speaking, to fully secure citizens’ 
conviction of their own worth. How should we arbitrate potential conflicts between 
the FVG and nonpolitical liberties and which particular redistributive and regulatory 
measures realizing it commands are tasks for another time. 
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